论运气的道德价值——威廉斯与内格尔道德运气理论之异同

On the Moral Value of Luck——Similarities and Differences between Williams and Nagel’s Theory of Moral Luck

道德运气属于一种不受意志支配或至少部分不受意志影响的偶然性因素,它对道德评价的倾向、道德责任的归属以及道德价值的实现具有重要影响。威廉斯从行动者自身的合理性证明角度论证了道德运气的意义,内格尔则从道德评价的一般性条件中得出运气的价值。两位思想家通过道德运气的概念挑战了康德关于意志自由、责任条件和道德限度等方面的基本观点,也揭示了我们关于这些道德根本问题的通常观点存在着诸多不连贯和不一致的方面。这也证明了运气的道德价值。

The moral luck is the accidental factor which is not subject to the will, or at least in part not under the influence of the will. It has an important influence on the moral judgment inclination, attribution of moral responsibility, and realization of moral values. Williams demonstrates the signifi- cance of the moral luck from the perspective of the rationality of the actors themselves, and Nagel demonstrates it by finding the general conditions of moral judgment. These two thinkers challenge Kant＇ s basic views about the free will, the conditions of liability and moral limits by the concept of moral luck, and reveal that there are many incoherent and inconsistent aspects about the general views of the fundamental moral problems, which also proves the moral value of luck.