政治关系、银行贷款与民营企业商业信用筹资

Political Relations, Bank Loans and Commercial Credit Financing of Private Enterprises

以我国沪深证券交易所2003-2010年1582个民营上市公司的观测数据为样本,结合我国经济转型期特殊的制度背景,实证检验政治关系、银行贷款与民营企业商业信用筹资之间的关系。研究发现,民营企业的商业信用筹资与其获得的银行贷款存在显著的替代关系,且这一效应在以预收账款作为主要商业信用筹资方式时表现得更强烈。研究结果证实,在制度缺失条件下,政治关系能够给民营企业带来一系列的融资便利,减少企业对其他成本较高的替代性资金来源的需求,但政治关系在金融资源的配置过程中常常伴有高昂的寻租成本,造成新的资源配置的扭曲。鉴于此,特提出改革我国现行不合理的国有垄断的金融体系,加大私有产权的法律保护力度,降低和弱化政府对经济的过度干预,努力为每个企业营造一个更加市场化的外部融资环境等政策建议。

Taking the observed data of 1582 private companies listed in China＇s Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2010 as the samples, this paper, in the context of the special institution during China＇s economic transition, conducts an empirical test of the correlation between political relations, bank loans and commercial credit financing of private enterprises. The results indicate that there is a significant alternative correlation between commercial credit financing of private enterprises and their obtained bank loans, and this effect is even stronger if deposit received is taken as the major source of commercial credit financing. The results also confirms that under the conditions of system absence, political relations can bring a range of financing facilities to private enterprises, reducing their demand for other higher-cost alternative sources of funding. But political relations are often accompanied with the high cost of rent-seeking in the process of allocation of financial resources, resulting distortions in new resource allocations. In view of this, this paper proposes such policy recommendations as to reform the current unreasonable financial system of state-owned monopoly, improve the legal protection of private property rights, reduce and weaken the excessive intervention of the government in the economy, and strive to create a more market-oriented external financing environment for each enterprise, etc..