摘要
采用最狭义的定义,2012年底中国影子银行的规模约为14或20万亿人民币(取决于官方数据还是市场估算)。中国式影子银行体系兴起的原因,从投融资中介角度来看源自商业银行的监管套利,从融资方看主要是宏观调控方向转变背景下重点调控行业与中小民营企业的融资需求,从投资方看源自居民部门在金融抑制环境下旺盛的投资需求。中国式影子银行是金融抑制环境下的自发性金融创新行为,有助于克服制度缺陷、提高资源配置效率。它虽然缓解了宏观调控对企业层面的不利冲击,但同时降低了央行的货币政策效力。为应对中国式影子银行的潜在风险,中国政府应该积极规范与引导影子银行体系发展、加强对影子银行体系的监管与信息披露要求、厘清各方权责关系以打破刚性兑付格局、加快金融改革步伐以降低套利空间。
The scale of China’s shadow banking was worth around 14 trillion yuan,according to official data,or as much as 20 trillion yuan,according to market estimation,by the end of 2012,even using the narrowest definition.Causes of China’s burgeoning shadow banking include the strong financing demand from property developers,local government-sponsored financing vehicles and small and medium-sized enterprises,the strong investment demand from Chinese households under financial repression,and the commercial banks’strong incentive for regulation-induced arbitrage.China’s shadow banking,as self-developed innovative financial activities resulting from financial repression,is conducive to reducing systematic deficiencies and improving efficiency of resource allocation.Although it eases the shocks of macroeconomic regulation on the corporate sector,it also affected the efficacy of the central bank’s monetary policies.The main risks posed by China’s shadow banking are the liquidity risk caused by maturity mismatch,the credit default risk and the challenge to the efficacy of monetary policies.To resolve those risks,the Chinese government should strengthen supervision and regulation of shadow banking,properly guide its healthy development and require better information disclosure of related products.Rights and responsibilities of related parties should also be clarified.The de facto market rule that if default happened,the government would intervene to reduce losses of investors should be broken.China also needs to accelerate its financial reform to reduce the incentive for institutional arbitrage.
出处
《国际经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期81-92,6,共12页
International Economic Review