期刊文献+

不对称信息对企业所得税逃避及税收筹划影响的博弈分析 被引量:6

Game Analysis on the Influence of the Tax Evasion and Tax Planning of the Corporate Income by Asymmetric Information
下载PDF
导出
摘要 在纳税人存在多种应纳税所得时,将企业治理结构中的委托-代理关系作为核心要素,在集中考虑税收逃避与税务筹划双重行为的基础上,通过对"税收征管机关-纳税人"之间的征纳行为进行刻画,构建了不完全信息多阶段博弈模型。在无委托-代理与委托-代理两种状态下,得出了博弈均衡解并分别进行了分析;进一步地,通过无委托-代理与委托-代理两种状态的比较,指出了委托-代理会带来效率损失问题。分析了一系列税收征管变量的经济效应,指出税率、逃税惩罚率、审计率等的提升会显著地降低企业主与管理人员的期望收益,但会促使企业为减少税负而进行税收逃避,加大了其收益的波动风险。同时指出了所得税逃避并不适合日益强化的税收征管环境。为此,在委托-代理环境下,企业主通过设计相关契约及加强监督等措施,一方面,可以有效规避管理人员的税收逃避行为,鼓励其税务筹划行为;另一方面,可以提升企业主与管理人员的期望收益。 when multiply taxable income for taxpayer existed, the principal-agent relationship at the corporate governance structure as a core element,the dual - action of tax evasion and tax planning being considered centralized, through the lev-ying - paying action description betweenthe tax collection authority and the taxpayer, one multi - stage game model under in-complete information environment is established. The equilibrium game solutions are obtained, analyzed by followed under the principal - agent state and without principal - agent state. Further,by using two state comparisons between principal - agent state and without principal - agent state, the loss of efficiency caused by principal - agent is pointed out. The economic effects with series of variables concerning tax - collecting isanalyzed. Although the expected return for the business owners and managers will be reduced significantly by the improvement of tax rate, tax evasion penalty rates, audit rates, the fluctua-tion risk will be enlarged because the enterprise want to reduce its tax burden by using the way of tax evasion. And the in-come tax evasion ,which isn't suitable for increasingly sophisticated tax- collecting environment, is pointed out. Under the principal - agent environment,by designing related contract and taking more supervisory measures with business owners, as a result, on the one hand, managers will be encouraged to avoid tax evasion behavior and to encourage tax planning behavior instead; on the other hand,the expectations of earnings can enhanced for the business owners and management.
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第5期86-92,共7页 Soft Science
基金 国家自然基金青年科学基金项目(71203161) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJCZH121) 浙江省社会科学界联合会研究项目(2012N046) 温州市哲学社会科学规划一级重点课题项目(12wsk010) 温州大学校级教改资助项目(2010KC10) 温州大学瓯江学院教改资助项目(2010JG011) 温州大学瓯江学院院级重点课程资助项目(2011ZK003)
关键词 委托-代理 不对称信息 所得税逃避 所得税筹划 博弈分析 principal - agent asymmetric information tax evasion of corporate income tax Planning of corporate income game analysis
  • 相关文献

参考文献14

  • 1Grant Richardson. The Relationship between Culture and Tax Eva- sion Across Countries:Additional Evidence and Extensions [ J ]. Jour- nal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2008, 17 (2) :67 -78.
  • 2Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Administration [ J ]. Handbook of Public Economics ,2002,3 : 1423 - 1470.
  • 3Friedrich Schneider. Shadow Economies Around the World:What dowe Really Know? [ J ]. Ernopean Journal of Political Economy, 2005,21:598 -642.
  • 4Ratbek Dzhumashev, Emin Gahramanov. A Growth Model with In- come Tax Evasion:Some Implications for Australia[ J ]. The Econom- ic Record,2010,86 (275) :620 - 636.
  • 5James Alto, Edward B. Sennoga. Mobility, Competition, and the Dis- tributional Effects of Tax Evasion[ J]. National Tax Journal ,2010,63 (4) :1055 - 1084.
  • 6George T. Tsakumis et, al. The Relation between National Cultural Dimensions and Tax Evasion [ J ]. Journal of International Account- ing, Auditing and Taxation, 2007,16 : 131 - 147.
  • 7Allingham M G, Sandmo A. Income Tax Evasion:A Theoretical Anal- ysis[ J]. Journal of Public Economics1972 ,1:323 - 338.
  • 8Rainald Borck. Stricter Enforcement may Increase Tax Evasion [ J ]. European Journal of Political Economy ,2004,20:725 -737.
  • 9李富强,李斌.委托代理模型与激励机制分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003,20(9):29-33. 被引量:51
  • 10汪贤裕,颜锦江.委托代理关系中的激励和监督[J].中国管理科学,2000,8(3):33-38. 被引量:65

二级参考文献17

  • 1骆品亮.销售人员的薪酬机制设计研究综述[J].管理工程学报,2001,15(1):50-54. 被引量:19
  • 2吕涛,聂锐.企业销售人员管理控制研究述评[J].预测,2005,24(3):13-18. 被引量:8
  • 3威廉森 路易斯·普特曼 等.《企业的约束:激励和行政特征》[A].路易斯·普特曼等.《企业的经济性质》:中译本[C].上海财经大学出版社,2000..
  • 4[美]丹尼尔·F·斯普尔伯 (张军译).《市场的微观结构——中间层组织与厂商理论》[M].中国人民大学出版社,2002..
  • 5陈志俊等译.《激励理论——委托代理模型》[M].中国人民大学出版社,2002..
  • 6威廉森.《治理机制》:中译本[M].中国社会科学出版社,2001..
  • 7张维迎,博弈论与信息经济学,1996年
  • 8埃瑞克·G·菲吕博顿 等.《新制度经济学》[M].上海财经大学出版社,2002..
  • 9Changning zhang, Vijay Mahajan. Development of Optimal Salesforce Compensation Plans for Independent, Complementary and Substitutable Products [ J ]. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 1995 : 355 - 362.
  • 10George John and Barton Weitz. Salesforce Compensation : an Empirical Investigation of Factors Related to Use of Salary Versus Incentive Compensation [ J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1989, 26: 1- 14.

共引文献117

同被引文献21

引证文献6

二级引证文献5

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部