摘要
在纳税人存在多种应纳税所得时,将企业治理结构中的委托-代理关系作为核心要素,在集中考虑税收逃避与税务筹划双重行为的基础上,通过对"税收征管机关-纳税人"之间的征纳行为进行刻画,构建了不完全信息多阶段博弈模型。在无委托-代理与委托-代理两种状态下,得出了博弈均衡解并分别进行了分析;进一步地,通过无委托-代理与委托-代理两种状态的比较,指出了委托-代理会带来效率损失问题。分析了一系列税收征管变量的经济效应,指出税率、逃税惩罚率、审计率等的提升会显著地降低企业主与管理人员的期望收益,但会促使企业为减少税负而进行税收逃避,加大了其收益的波动风险。同时指出了所得税逃避并不适合日益强化的税收征管环境。为此,在委托-代理环境下,企业主通过设计相关契约及加强监督等措施,一方面,可以有效规避管理人员的税收逃避行为,鼓励其税务筹划行为;另一方面,可以提升企业主与管理人员的期望收益。
when multiply taxable income for taxpayer existed, the principal-agent relationship at the corporate governance structure as a core element,the dual - action of tax evasion and tax planning being considered centralized, through the lev-ying - paying action description betweenthe tax collection authority and the taxpayer, one multi - stage game model under in-complete information environment is established. The equilibrium game solutions are obtained, analyzed by followed under the principal - agent state and without principal - agent state. Further,by using two state comparisons between principal - agent state and without principal - agent state, the loss of efficiency caused by principal - agent is pointed out. The economic effects with series of variables concerning tax - collecting isanalyzed. Although the expected return for the business owners and managers will be reduced significantly by the improvement of tax rate, tax evasion penalty rates, audit rates, the fluctua-tion risk will be enlarged because the enterprise want to reduce its tax burden by using the way of tax evasion. And the in-come tax evasion ,which isn't suitable for increasingly sophisticated tax- collecting environment, is pointed out. Under the principal - agent environment,by designing related contract and taking more supervisory measures with business owners, as a result, on the one hand, managers will be encouraged to avoid tax evasion behavior and to encourage tax planning behavior instead; on the other hand,the expectations of earnings can enhanced for the business owners and management.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期86-92,共7页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然基金青年科学基金项目(71203161)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJCZH121)
浙江省社会科学界联合会研究项目(2012N046)
温州市哲学社会科学规划一级重点课题项目(12wsk010)
温州大学校级教改资助项目(2010KC10)
温州大学瓯江学院教改资助项目(2010JG011)
温州大学瓯江学院院级重点课程资助项目(2011ZK003)
关键词
委托-代理
不对称信息
所得税逃避
所得税筹划
博弈分析
principal - agent
asymmetric information
tax evasion of corporate income
tax Planning of corporate income
game analysis