一种两阶段供应链非对称信息甄别模型

An Asymmetric Information Screening Model for A Two-stage Supply Chain

对两阶段供应链非对称信息甄别问题,基于一般性假设,构建了博弈模型。在分析一阶段信息甄别模型的基础上,结合Stackelberg博弈模型和激励机制理论,将其扩展到两阶段逆向选择动态契约,并分阶段求出其次优解。在代理人各阶段披露的市场信息相关前提下,分析了不同阶段信息相关性对契约的影响,基于贝叶斯信息更新,给出了两阶段逆向选择模型的线性分成制转移支付的形式;针对上述问题给出了数学建模及求解。

We construct a two-stage game model for screening asymmetric information. the one-stage relationship to a two-stage adverse selection contract and find its second Stackelberg game model and the theory of incentive mechanism. In a more general case Then, we extend -best solution by where the agent （retailer） has private information on the type of market, we discuss the influence of these factors on dynamic contracts. Using Bayesian update, we provide the solution of linearly shared saving contract transfer payment. For all the problems, we provide quantitative models, respectively.