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群体性冲突中利益调节的三方博弈模型研究 被引量:4

Study of Tripartite Game Model on Interest Adjustment of Group Conflict Management Engineering
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摘要 通过分析群体性冲突中各利益主体之间的博弈行为,运用演化博弈的方法建立了非政府组织与冲突双方的三方博弈模型,并寻求博弈均衡点。通过分析均衡解,认为冲突双方是否选择和解取决于非政府组织调解成功的概率、协调成本和冲突双方不愿意和解时所产生的损失。 In the group conflict, the biggest contradiction often is to fight for the ownership of interest, and the focus is on how to make the interest maximization. When the two parties in the game can't properly resolve the contradiction and the game is stalemated, we introduce the third party non-governmental organizations to mediate contradiction and even resolve the contradiction between the two parties. Through analysis of the game behavior between main stakeholders in group conflict, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to establish the tripartite game model with the non-govemmental organizations and the two parties in conflict, and pursuits equilibrium points of the game. Through the analysis of the equilibrium, the paper concludes whether the two parties choose mediation depends on the non-governmental organizations' probability of success to mediation, the costs of mediation, and the loss generated by that conflict in which the two parties don't compromise.
机构地区 西安理工大学
出处 《电子科技大学学报(社科版)》 2013年第2期13-16,共4页 Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71173171)
关键词 群体性冲突 利益调节 演化博弈模型 group conflict interest adjustment evolutionary game model
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