差分功耗分析攻击下密码芯片风险的量化方法

Value-at-risk quantitative method about password chip under differential power analysis attacks

针对差分功耗分析(DPA)攻击的原理及特点,利用核函数估算密码芯片工作过程中功耗泄漏量的概率分布密度,通过计算密钥猜测正确时攻击模型与功耗泄漏量之间的互信息熵,将密码芯片在面对DPA攻击时所承受的风险进行了量化。实验表明,该风险量化方法能够很好地估算出密钥猜测正确时攻击模型与功耗泄漏量之间的相关度,并为完整的密码芯片风险分析提供重要指标。

Based on the principle and characteristics of the Differential Power Analysis （DPA） attack, the kernel function was used to estimate the probability distribution density of the leakage of power consumption in the password chip work process. By calculating the mutual information between the attack model and the power leakage, when the guessed key was correct, this paper quantified the risk value of the password chip in the face of DPA attacks. The experiments show that the risk quantification method can be a good estimate of the correlation degree between the attack model and power leakage when the guessed key is correct and then provides important indicators to complete password chip risk evaluation.