业绩评价、职业声誉和基金经理行为异化

Performance Evaluation,Reputation Incentive and the Distortion in Fund Managers' Behavior

本文以开放式基金经理更换事件为样本,从隐性激励角度分析了业绩评价机制和职业声誉机制的相互作用及其对基金经理行为异化的影响。研究结果表明,我国基金业盛行的短期业绩评价机制扭曲了基金经理声誉激励机制,造成了基金经理的羊群行为和短期行为,特别是对于年轻、资历浅的基金经理更是如此。但长期业绩评价机制下基金经理的行为没有异化。所以,基金业短期业绩评价机制亟待改善,建立长效激励机制势在必行。

With the impressive growth of China＇s Securities Investment Fund, small-medium investors have va- rious investment tools nowadays. In contrary to the rapid development of fund, the performance is not so well-pleas- ing. Many factors can contribute to the fund performance, many people think that fund managers＇ ability may be the main reason for poor performance. Though, we think that it has much to do with fund managers＇ behavior instead of ability. Several articles show that managers＇ behavior is one of the critical factors that determine fund performance. To some extent, fund managers＇ herd and short-term behaviors should be responsible for the poor performance of China＇s Securities Investment Fund. Herd and short-term behaviors are two types of distortion in fund managers＇ behavior, and this distortion can a- rise in a variety of contexts, the drawback of incentive mechanism is one of the most important factors that lead to these behaviors. It is known that incentive mechanism can provide managers with incentives and constraints. But the problems of fund managers＇ behavior in China indicate that the current incentive mechanism can not have a posi- tive impact on managers＇ behavior. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to check the drawbacks of incentive mecha- nism, and then examine how they influence fund managers＇ behavior, and if the defect of incentive mechanism re- sult in fund managers＇ herd and short-term behavior. Both explicit and implicit incentives are included in incentive mechanism. Career concerns is a type of implicit incentive. Several theories of reputation suggest that managers＇ career concerns affect their decisions. From the per- spective of career concerns, this paper studies whether the drawback of reputation incentive has led to fund managers＇ herd and short-term behavior. From the perspective of implicit incentive, Using the sample statistics pe- riod from 2005 to 2010, this study uses a sample of open-ended fund managers＇ replacement to analyze performance evaluation and reputation incentive and their interaction with distortion in fund managers＇ behavior. In this article, First, by designing a Logistic model, we use the data on Chinese open-ended fund managers＇ replacements and the managers＇ past performance to examine the relationship between fund performance and fund managers＇ replacement, from which we can make a judge that whether the reputation incentive is perfect or not. Second, we examine if the drawback of reputation incentive induce fund mangers to herd and speculate. Third, we analyze what kind of fund managers are more likely to ＂follow the herd＂ and speculate. In china, the replacement of the mutual fund managers is much more frequent than any other western countries like the US. The empirical results show that fund mangers＇ replacements are mainly based on their short-term per- formance, namely, managers with poor performance in the short time are more likely to be demoted or fired, while managers with pleasing performance in the short time can get promotion easily. This phenomenon called ＂Fund Championship＂. Essentially, the reputation incentive mechanism is distorted by ＂Fund Championship＂-a short- term evaluation system, to some extent, it leads to managers＇ herd and short-term behavior, what＇s more, we find that young managers and managers with poor past performance or shorter serving time would tend to herd and specu- late. While our results show that distortion behavior dosen＇t happen when managers are appraised under the long- term performance evaluation. So it is really urgent to establish long-term incentive mechanism instead of short-term performance evaluation. Finally, we bring forward some suggestions in this article to solve problems above： Firstly, reforming fund e- valuation and establishing a scientific evaluation system to assess fund managers＇ investment ability; Then, exten- ding the ＂fund holding＂ incentive project, providing fund managers with more reasonable incentives to make good performance; Thirdly, establishing a rational personnel training mechanism so as to reduce fund managers replace- ment.