投资者保护、政治联系与资本配置效率

Investor Protection,Political Connection and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation

本文以2004～2009年间中国民营上市公司为研究样本,考察了地区投资者保护与政治联系对企业资本配置效率的影响。研究发现:(1)良好的地区投资者保护会提高公司投资效率,降低融资约束,而政治联系对投资效率的影响不显著;(2)相比没有政治联系的上市公司,投资者保护机制对具有政治联系公司的资本配置效率的影响更加明显;(3)在投资者保护水平越高的地区,企业投资支出能带来越高的业绩增长,而政治联系未对业绩增长与投资支出之间的敏感性产生影响。本文将投资者保护制度与政治联系同时纳入研究框架,为我们比较转型经济中正式制度环境与非正式替代性机制的作用提供了有益视角。

Using the sample of the Chinese private listed firms from 2004 to 2009, this paper tests the impact of local investor protection and political connections on the firm＇s capital allocation efficiency. The results suggest that firstly, better investor protection can improve investment efficiency and reduce financing constrain, while political connections have no effect on investment efficiency. Secondly, comparing with the firms with no politi cal connections, investor protection has more significant effect on the capital allocation of the finns with political connections. Thirdly, firm level investment predicts growth more strongly in the regions with better investor protection, while political connections have no significant effect on the firm＇s growth sensitivity to investment. This paper combines investor protection system and political connections into the research framework, and pro vides us with a meaningful perspective to compare formal institutional environment with informal substitute insti tution in the transitional economy.