摘要
随着现代企业管理理论的发展,工作设计对产出效率的影响越来越受到重视。本文针对经营者的激励问题,讨论了在模糊工作偏好条件下,基于工作设计的隐性激励机制。首先梳理了工作设计的相关理论,并用工作的系统性、授权度和自由度来描述工作的复杂性。基于委托-代理理论,建立了具有模糊偏好的工作设计激励模型,并依据模型的结果讨论了工作偏好、工作复杂程度以及工作关联度对经营者激励机制的影响,提出了相应的激励措施。最后,对基于工作设计的激励机制进行了案例分析。
With the development of modern managerial theory for enterprise,more and more attention is paid to the affection of job design upon output efficiency.The implicit incentive mechanism is discussed in the paper based on the job design considering the fuzzy job preference in connection with the incentive problems of managers.Firstly,the complexity of job is described with the degree of systematicness,freedom and authorization,after combing the job design theories.Then the incentive model of job design with fuzzy job preference is put forward based on the principal-agent theory.The affections of job preference,job complexity and job association are analyzed on the basis of the results of the model,and the incentive measures are raised accordingly.Finally,a case is given to analyze the incentive mechanism of job design.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期51-54,59,共5页
Forecasting
基金
国家软科学资助项目(2011GXS2D036)
关键词
经营者
工作设计
隐性激励
managers
job design
implicit incentive
