公平关切对批发价格契约协调效果的影响

The Influence of Retailer 's Fairness Concerning on Coordination Performance of Wholesale Price Contract

基于品牌竞争与渠道竞争共存的两级供应链结构,本文研究了零售商的公平关切行为对批发价格契约供应链协调效果的影响问题。通过模型建立和数据仿真,本文将零售商采取公平关切行为下批发价格契约的供应链协调绩效,与零售商不采取公平关切行为时批发价格契约及收益共享契约的协调绩效进行对比,发现:(1)当零售商实力与制造商相当时,零售商的公平关切行为可以使批发价格契约实现更高的协调绩效;(2)当零售商实力水平明显强于制造商时,零售商的公平关切行为使批发价格契约相比纯粹的收益共享契约表现出优势。

With the background of a two-echelon supply chain with both channel and brand competition,this article addresses the impact of the retailer ＇s fairness concerning behavior on wholesale price contract ＇s supply chain coordination performance.Based on model construction and data imitation,the paper compares the coordination performance of wholesale price contract when the retailer concerns fairness,with the coordination performance of wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract.Finally,two main conclusions are proved：（1）When the power of the retailer and the manufacturer is comparable,the retailer ＇s behavior of fairness concerns will improve the performance of wholesale price contract;（2）When the retailer dominating the supply chain,the wholesale price contract under the retailer ＇s fairness concerning behavior performs better than the pure revenue sharing contract.