中国国有企业的国际议价能力估算

The Estimation of International Bargaining Power of Chinese State-owned Enterprises

通过建立讨价还价理论模型,本文证明了谈判过程中让步成本较小的一方获得的收益较少。由于存在预算软约束和相对严重的委托代理问题,国有企业的让步并不会给代理人造成相应损失,相应地国有企业议价能力较低。本文运用2006年海关进出口交易数据,使用双边随机前沿分析方法(Two-tier SFA)测度谈判底线,估算了中国国有企业的国际议价能力。结果显示:①国有企业的讨价还价能力低于民营企业和外资企业;②国有企业的讨价还价能力也低于进出口交易伙伴,其进口价格高于公允价格3.69%,出口价格低于公允价格6.17%。因而继续推进市场化改革,中国才能在国际市场上获取公平的贸易收益。

By establishing a bargaining model,we proved that less concession costs will lead to less bargaining gains.Due to soft budget constraint and relative seriousness of the principal-agent problem,the state-owned enterprises make concessions without consequential costs,therefore bargaining power lowered.Using Custom data of year 2006 and two-tier SFA method,we estimated international bargaining power of China’s state-owned enterprises.The result showed that：（1）the bargaining power of SOEs are lower than private and foreign-funded enterprises;（2）bargaining power of SOEs are also lower than the import or export trading partners：import price is higher about 3.69% and export price is lower about 6.17% than the fair price.Therefore,China should continue promoting market oriented reforms to obtain fair trade gains in global market.