摘要
国有经济腐败现象严重的基本原因在于诸多监督制约的具体制度不科学,如:种种非科学观念和工作机制造成和容忍了"一把手"的个人专断权;国有企业监督体制设置形式主义严重,所有者基本被置于监督制度之外;经营管理制度漏洞多、不严密;对国资监管人员权力运用的制约不严格、无力度。有效遏制国有经济腐败现象及其他不合理行为,必须根据公有制的本性,按制衡有力、制度严密、监管民主的原则,对国有经济预防腐败监督制约体制实施革命性变革:以权制权,革除个人专断的制度性基础;民主反腐,所有者(人民群众)分享决策权、管理权和监督权;国家对企业进行制度干预,堵塞滋生腐败的制度性漏洞;制约国资监管的政府官员,国家规制监管科学化。国有经济监督机制改革,必须澄清一些思想误区,如"企业家"迷信、"政企分开"迷信和"反对政府干预"误区,"现代企业制度和法人治理结构"迷信、"国家"迷信和"所有者代表"误区等。
Basically speaking, the high-level corruption in state-owned economy results from unscientific supervision systems: various irrational concepts and work mechanisms lead to the arbitrary decision-making of leaders; the supervision systems in state-owned enterprises tend to be unserviceable; management operating systems are far from perfect; restrictions on supervisors of state assets are not strict enough. To effectively pre- vent the corruption in state-owned economy and other unreasonable behavior, revolution must be carried out in the supervision system against corruption in state-owned economy, such as to restrict power with power, to ad- vocate democracy, to limit the power of officials in charge of state assets, etc. Also, some misunderstandings, such as those of entrepreneurs, government intervention, modern enterprise systems and corporate governance, owner representatives, etc. , should be abandoned.
出处
《上海大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期60-76,共17页
Journal of Shanghai University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
国有经济
国企改革
民主管理
监督机制
state-owned economy
state-owned enterprise reform
democratic management
supervisory mechanism