力量不对等供应链中的零售商-制造商广告-研发博弈

Game on Advertisement-R&D of Retailer-manufacture in Power Asymmetric Two-echelon Supply Chain

论文分析了零售商主导的供应链上下游企业间的研发与广告合作行为,并比较了零售商主导和制造商主导时供应链的广告、研发投资和总利润。博弈与模拟分析揭示:零售商主导供应链时,零售商在斯坦伯格博弈均衡时的利润高于纳什均衡时,制造商在哪种博弈均衡时取得的收益更大视参数具体值而定,纳什均衡时零售商不分担制造商的研发费用;零售商主导供应链时,制造商在集中决策时的研发投入最高,零售商在何种博弈均衡时最优广告投入最高与具体参数有关;在一定条件下,零售商主导的供应链总利润更高。不同情形下的斯坦伯格博弈、纳什博弈和集中决策分析表明,渠道主导力量同时影响着供应链成员和整体运营绩效。

This research contributes to behavior analyses of the cooperative R＆D and advertisement investment between the upstream and downstream in a retailer dominated supply chain. The paper compares the investment （advertisement, R＆D） and total profit of the supply chain lead by the retailer and manufacture respectively. Combined execution of equilibria comparison and simulation reveals the retailer＇s profit with herself leading Stackelberg game greater than that in Nash game, the profit of the manufacturer as a follower varying with parameters and retailer＇s not sharing manufacturing R＆D input cost in Nash game. Moreover, the game follower manufacturer invests most in R＆D in centralized decision among all game scenarios. By contrast, maximum of optimal advertisement investment under which game equilibrium is determined by parameters, so does that for supply chain optimal R＆D and advertisement investments and total profit. The exploitation of various Stackelberg, Nash games and centralized decision-making demonstrates the impact of the channel dominance on chain-wide operational performance as well as on individuals＇ with scenario based comparisons.