控制权、现金流权分离与企业经营风险关系研究被引量：5

The Relationship between Operation Risk and Separation of Control Right and Cash Flow Right

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摘要本文从理论上研究了控制权与现金流权分离、控制股东目标函数和企业经营风险之间的内在关系,研究发现在两权分离的情况下,逐利本性会使控制股东谋求控制权私有收益的动机更为强烈,由此带来成本的增加和利润的减少,使得企业经营风险增大。本文采用2007~2011年间中国上市公司面板数据进行了实证检验,证实了现金流权与经营风险负相关,控制权和两权分离度与经营风险正相关。 This paper analyses the intrinsic relationship between the separation of control right and cash flow right,the target function of the controlling shareholders and the operation risk theoretically.We found that in the case of two right separation,the profit-driven nature let the controlling shareholders seeking the motion of private income more strongly,with this the cost will be increased and the profit will be reduced,and then enhanced operation risk.In this paper,we use the panel data between 2007 and 2011 of the listed companies in China to make an empirical test,the result confirm that cash flow rights is negatively related to the operation risk,control rights and the rights separation is positively related to the operation risk.

作者侯剑平姚关琦庞媛

机构地区西安工业大学

出处《工业技术经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第5期33-40,共8页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基金国家自然科学基金"基于近似支持向量机模型和风险视角的商业银行公司治理评价"(项目编号:70673054) 陕西省教育厅科研基金"陕西上市公司高管激励机制与绩效内生性关系研究"(项目编号:12JK0131) 西安工业大学校长基金(项目编号:XAGDXZJJ0823)和西安工业大学科研创新团队建设计划项目资助

关键词控制权现金流权经营杠杆系数经营风险 control right cash flow right operating leverage operation risk

分类号 H063.1 [语言文字—语言学]

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