灵魂、和谐与“身体的现实”——亚里士多德的灵魂概念及其对和谐论的批判

Soul, Harmonia and the Actuality of Body: Aristotle’s Definition of Soul and His Refutation of the Theory of Harmonia

亚里士多德在《论灵魂》第一卷第四章对以恩培多克勒为代表的和谐理论提出了批判,认为灵魂不能被界定为"和谐"。这个批判被认为是亚里士多德提出并论证其灵魂概念的关键步骤。本文指出,亚里士多德对和谐论的批驳实际上诉诸两个前提:第一,灵魂是实体;第二,灵魂与身体不能分离。这两个前提源于他在《形而上学》中对质料与形式的设想与论证,并导致他的灵魂论一方面重视身体层面的因素、反对将灵魂设想为脱离身体的存在;另一方面又坚持灵魂作为实体和原因的地位,反对以"混合物"或混合物的"比率"来界定灵魂。本文试图说明,亚里士多德实际上是要努力在早期柏拉图与和谐论的灵魂学说之间走出一条中间路线,通过对二者的批判来提出一个新的灵魂概念,即"身体的形式"或者说"身体的现实"。本文由此认为,尽管亚里士多德对于和谐论的概括和批评存在着一定程度的误解甚至误导,但他确实消除了和谐论的灵魂学说中所包含的宗教色彩,以一种与现代科学更为接近的思路对灵魂的本质和功能重新做出了界定和说明,这种路径无疑为其道德心理学的研究打开了空间。

In De Anima I.4, Aristotle criticizes the theory of harmonia represented by, among others, Empedocles, arguing that soul cannot be defined as harmonia. This critique is taken to be a crucial step as Aristotle advances and demonstrates his conception of soul. In this paper, I shall argue that Aristotle’s refutation of the theory of harmonia is actually based on two premises: first, soul is substance; second, soul is inseparable from body. These premises are based on Aristotle’s conception of and arguments about matter and form in Metaphysics, and endow a double feature to his doctrine of soul. This doctrine puts emphasis on the element of body, and argues against conceiving of soul as that which exists in separation from body. On the other hand, it defends the idea that soul is both substance and archē, and fights against the attempt to define soul in the light of synthesis or the ratio of synthesis. This paper is intended to show that Aristotle tries to develop a middle line between the early Platonic notion of the soul and the theory of harmonia. On the basis of his critique of the two notions he works out a new conception of soul as the form of or the actuality of body. It follows that even though Aristotle’s generalization and criticism of the theory of harmonia are to some extent misleading, he does dispel some religious implications of that theory, and gives a new definition and explanation of the nature and function of the soul in a way much closer to modern science, which will undoubtedly open a space for studying his moral psychology.