基于跨期侵占视角的控股股东跨期减持行为

Controlling shareholder's intemperate reduction under intemperate expropriation

在考虑新投资机会存在的基础上,构建了跨期投资下的控股股东跨期侵占模型,并分析控股股东跨期减持行为.研究发现,理性控股股东会通过第二期的侵占行为控制最优减持比例.理论模型表明主要影响减持的因素包括控股股东初始持股比例、控股股东属性及外部法律保护力度:初始持股比例高及外部法律保护力度强的地区的上市公司的控股股东的减持水平更高,国有控股上市公司的控股股东不倾向进行减持.经验证据表明,控股股东初始持股比例和控股股东属性会产生影响,而外部法律保护力度的影响则不确定.

Based on the considering of new investment opportunities, this paper sets up a controlling shareholders occupation model under the intemperate investment and analyzes the temporal reduction of controlling shareholders. It is discovered that rational shareholder will control through the second act of the optimal reduction of the proportion of occupied. Theory model shows that the main factors affected reduction include initial proportion of controlling holders, the characteristic of controlling shareholders and the external legal protection. The initial proportions of controlling shareholders and external protection efforts of investors have positive impact. Comparing to non-state holding shareholders, the state-holding shareholders don＇t prefer reduction. Empirical evidence shows that initial proportion of controlling holders and the characteristic of controlling shareholders have the effect. But it is uncertain that the factors of the external legal protection impact the level of controlling shareholders＇ reduction.