分税制效率的经济学分析——基于分税制与包干制的比较研究

Economic Analysis of the Tax-sharing System's efficiency: Comparative Study based on Tax-sharing system and Contract system

本文构建了一个简单的中央-地方政府的两阶段博弈模型,基于寻租这个视角,探讨了财政体制演变过程中地方政府行为的变化及其宏观经济后果,较好地解释了中央转移支付低效率的根源。结果发现,分税制较包干制是制度上的改进,它的效率取决于中央政府设定的税收分享比例,即依赖于地方政府财权和事权的合理配置。此外,在分税制下,中央转移支付虽然能够实现地方公共投资的最优水平,但是它却激励了地方政府的寻租活动,抑制了中央和地方的公共品投资,因而是破坏社会福利的。

This paper incorporates the local governments＇ rent-seeking activities in a multigovernment setting and investigates the local governments＇ behavior and effect on macroeconomic in the evolution of the financial system, reasonably explained the source of central transfers＇ low efficiency. The tax-sharing system is the institutional improvements comparing with the contract system and its efficiency depends on the proportion of tax sharing set by the central government, That is , depend on the local revenue-expenditure allocation. Moreover, In the tax-sharing system, the central transfers is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities and therefore depresses useful public goods provided by both the central and local governments, even if its game may attain the first-best level of public investment.