会计稳健性、盈余管理和投资效率——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Accounting Conservatism,Earning Management and Investment Efficiency:An Empirical Evidence form Chinese Listed Companies

会计稳健性是一把双刃剑，一方面它可以缓解管理层与投资者之间信息不对称，保护投资者利益，另一方面它为盈余管理行为提供可乘之机，损害企业价值和投资者利益。本文以2007～2010年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，通过考察会计稳健性与投资效率之间的关系，验证会计稳健性在我国当前经济制度背景下能否发挥正向效应。结果显示，在控制盈余管理因素之后，会计稳健性与投资过度（不足）水平显著负相关。本文的研究结论对资本市场监管和准则制定部门选择适合我国经济环境的会计稳健性政策具有一定的启示意义。

Accounting conservatism has double effects, on one hand it can alleviate information asymmetry to protect the interests of investors, and on the other hand it provides an opportunity for the earning management behavior, which may damage the corporate value and the interests of investors. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2011, this paper investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism and capital investment efficiency in order to prove the existence of the corporate governance role of accounting conservatism. The result shows that accounting conservatism is significantly negative related to over-investment and under- investment after controlling the earning management factor, which provides the evidence that accounting conservatism can reduce the information asymmetry and force the managers entrust their responsibility. These results have some enlightenment significances for regulators in regulation of capital market and for standard makers to choose conservative accounting policies correctly.