摘要
目前针对火灾、泥石流等突发性事件引起的生态公益林的毁坏,许多省份给予每亩500—700元的定额赔偿金,并且保险定价有一定的随意性。由于林改后对生态公益林的补贴一般每亩只有10—20元,相对于保险赔偿金则过低,如此便产生了生态公益林保险的变相融资道德风险倾向,即:林农很可能为套取保险资金而消极防御火灾,甚至故意纵火。运用林农效用函数,通过确定性等价收入等理论定出生态公益林的保险价格,设计出一套实物支付与分期付款相结合的保险方案,有效地规避了此类道德风险的发生。
Ecological forest only 10-20 Yuan per mu after forest reform, compensation compared with subsidies is too low. The current insurance for ecological forests have the moral hazard tendencies： for- esters earn insurance funds with a passive defense fire and even the deliberate arson. We use utility function set ecological forest insurance prices through the use of certainty equivalence, and design an insurance program which combine payment in kind with installment. It effective avoids moral hazard.
出处
《金融理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期90-94,共5页
Financial Theory and Practice
