疏忽责任与责任保险的需求

Negligence Liability and the Demand of Liability Insurance

本文研究侵权法体系里疏忽责任制度的两个重要特点。首先,根据单侧模型的分析,在疏忽责任制度里过度严格的行业标准并不会抑制企业的风险活动,因为他们可以选择成为"疏忽"而不需要去忍受过多的预防成本;其次,研究了为什么理论上疏忽责任制度里不存在责任保险的需求,但实际上在实施疏忽责任制度的国家里责任保险却异常发达的原因;通过信息模型,给出了责任保险存在的两个必要条件:一是信息的价值必须为正,二是阻止的成本必须大于满足不成为"疏忽"标准的注意成本和保险成本之和。

In this paper, we study the two important characteristics of the negligence liability in the tort law system. First of all, according to the analysis of unilateral model, we know the excessive strict industry standard in negligence re-sponsibility system will not restrain the enterprise＇s risk activities, because they can choose to become ＂negligence＂ and not need to endure the prevention cost too much. Secondly, we show the reasons that although there is no liability insur-ance requirement in the negligence liability system, but in fact the countries with the negligence liability system own a developed liability insurance market. Finally, based on a information model, this paper gives two necessary conditions for the existence of liability insurance： one is the value of information must be positive; the another is the cost of stop must be greater than the sum of the insurance cost and the care cost which can satisfy the ＂negligence＂ standard.