进入成本对最优公开保留价影响的博弈分析

Game Analysis of the Entry Costs and the Optimal Public Reserve Price

本文将拍卖中有关进入成本的研究内容进行扩展,将进入成本与最优公开保留价策略结合,对标准招标中存在同质和异质进入成本时的最优公开保留价定价问题进行了研究。经过研究,发现在公开保留价的情况下,不同进入成本对招标人的期望支出、投标人的期望效用以及社会净支出方面的影响是不同,从而招标的最优公开保留价定价策略也是不同的。当投标人之间存在同质进入成本时,招标公开保留价应与招标人的真实估价相同;当投标人之间存在异质进入成本时,招标最优公开保留价不应小于标准招标模型中的最优公开保留价。

Based on standard bidding model, this paper studies the optimal public reserve price when bidders have the homogeneous and heterogeneous enter costs. After the research, we find that the entry costs impact the tenderee＇ s expected revenue, the bidders＇ expected utility and the social welfare under the condition of public reserve price. When there is homogeneous entry costs, the optimal public reserve price should be as the same as the tenderee＇ s true valuation When there is heterogeneity entry costs, the optimal public reserve price of the standard bidding model price should not be less than the optimal public reserve