公交网络车费设定问题的Stackelberg博弈模型

A Stackelberg game model of fare structure for public transport network

对城市公交网络系统车费的合理设定问题进行了研究分析 .考虑到乘客对公交收费变动会作出相应的反应 ,从而改变网络上乘客的流量分布 .运用 Stackelberg博弈理论 ,将这一问题描述为一个两级数学规划问题 .在一定的公交网络收费结构下 ,乘客在网络上的流量分布可由随机用户平衡分配模型进行估计 .鉴于两级规划问题的非凸性 ,提出了基于灵敏度分析的启发式算法 .最后 。

This paper shows how a public transport network fare structure could be determined so as to balance the passenger flow on the transport system and to reduce the overload delay of passengers. Considering passengers' behavior in response of changing fare structure, a Stackelberg bilevel programming method is developed to determine the optimal fare structure. The upper level problem seeks to minimize the total network cost, while the lower level problem is a stochastic user equilibrium transit assignment model with capacity constraints. A heuristic algorithm based on sensitivity analysis is developed. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the procedure of the proposed model and algorirhm.