摘要
董事会处于公司治理的核心地位,在公司从公到私的不同历史进化阶段,以及不同的立法例中,分别存在着立法者、司法者、监督者、战略管理、关系投资者战略联盟以及制约霸权等不同的定位和职能。而中国现行公司法中的董事会角色和定位,受制于股东本位的倾向,在法律规范的表述中呈现出定位不明,角色不清,并且其职能相比之下被股东会和经理侵蚀。但是在对董事责任的追究上却与之相矛盾,同时,在具体运作上也呈现出与应有的合议方式不相符的行为模式。中国版的董事会的权力配置、角色定位,是对现有宪政制度的简单模仿,虽然符合一国公司治理受制于政治传统的原理,但缺乏依据商业现实的需要而不断进化的回应动力。
Board of Directors plays an essential part in company governance, and there have been different orientations and functions of being legislator, judiciary, strategy management, strategic alliance of relation in- vestors, hegemony restriction, and etc. in the different cases of legislation and over different historical evolu- tion phases of the company changing from public to private ownership. The directors under the existing Chinese company law, restricted to the tendency role and orientation of the board of of stakeholder standard, however, take on unclear orientation and obscure role in the statement of law and regulations. Moreover, its functions are comparatively eroded by stakeholder conference and managers. To the contrary, it is conflicted with the in- vestigation for liability of directors, and in terms of operation, there is a behavior pattern not conforming to the proper collegiate system. Power allocation and role orientation of the board of directors in China simply imitate the existing constitutionalism system. In spite of the fact that the principle of company government in a country subject to political tradition is followed, a increasingly evolutionary correspondent driving force according to practical demand of commence lacks.
出处
《中国法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期98-108,共11页
China Legal Science