满足后向隐私的可扩展RFID双向认证方案

Scalable RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol with Backward Privacy

无线射频识别(RFID)系统的匿名认证机制可以有效地保护标签的隐私性,而可扩展性和后向隐私安全性是实际应用中需要考虑的两个重要问题.对最近新提出的3个可扩展RFID双向认证协议的安全性进行了分析.分析指出,ACP方案并不能提供后向隐私安全性;G-I方案不能抵抗去同步攻击,攻击者可以通过主动攻击,使得标签和阅读器内存储的密钥数据不一致,从而破坏标签和阅读器的后继认证;而MMR方案不能抵御主动攻击,攻击者可以仿冒合法阅读器,通过不断质询标签并分析标签的回复消息,就可完全推导出标签中存储的全部秘密.在此基础上,提出了一个基于Hash函数的可扩展双向认证方案,方案从存储需求和运算量上要优于G-I方案;并且证明了方案能够满足受限后向隐私安全,并可以抵御去同步攻击.

Anonymous authentication mechanisms can be used in RFID systems to preserve the privacy of the RFID tags. Scalability problem and backward privacy problem are two important issues considered in practice. In this paper, security analysis is presented on three recently proposed RFID authentication protocols satisfying scalability and backward privacy. The research shows that ACP protocol can not provide the property of backward privacy; the G-I protocol can not resist dysynchronization attack, i.e. the adversary can make the secrets stored in tag and reader unmatched, which results in the tag and the reader in a desynehronized state and renders future authentication impossible; and the MMR protocol can not resist active attack, because the adversary can extract tag＇s all secrets via querying the tag and analyzing the messages sent by the tag. In addition, we present a modified sealable hash-based mutual authentication protocol with less storage and computation requirements than G-I. And we prove our scheme can provide the property of backward privacy and resist the desynchronization attack.