摘要
建立了对双边用户交易金额按比例收费的运营商的双边市场模型,并进一步分析了在三种不同市场结构下,即运营商垄断,运营商竞争且增值服务提供商单归属或多归属时,抽成比例对运营商定价策略的影响.研究表明,随着抽成比例的增加,垄断的运营商有动机压制移动通信服务和移动增值服务的价格,以较高的抽成比例来最大化利润;无论增值服务提供商单归属或多归属,竞争的运营商都倾向于降低移动通信服务的价格,提高移动增值服务的价格以从移动增值服务市场中攫取更多的收益,此时抽成比例的增加反而会减少运营商的收益.
This paper develops a two-sided market model in which the tariff is levied on per-transaction basis, i.e. a ration of the price of mobile value-added services is charged by the MNO (mobile network operator). Furthermore, the impacts of the ratio on pricing strategies of the MNOs are analyzed under three market structures. These market structures are monopoly MNO, duopoly MNOs with single-home SPs (Service Providers) and duopoly MNOs with multi-home SPs. The results reveal that, as the ratio increases, the monopoly MNO has an incentive to lower the price of mobile communication services and the price of mobile value-added services, and obtains a higher revenue; however, the duopoly MNOs, whether the SPs single-homing or multi-homing, prefer to choose a higher price of mobile value-added services and a lower price of mobile communication services, while the revenues of the MNOs decrease in the ratio as the ratio increases.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第3期297-306,386,共11页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071033)
关键词
双边市场
移动网络运营商
定价策略
抽成比例
two-sided markets
mobile network operator(MNO)
pricing strategies
rake ratio