基于风险规避的网络广告两阶段收益定价模型

Two-stage revenue pricing model for internet advertising with the risk-aversion

建立了广告主和广告媒体之间的两阶段收益定价模型,应用纳什讨价还价方法确定了最优的两阶段的定价问题,界定了两阶段定价合同实施的可行性条件,分析了谈判力量与第一阶段定价的关系.研究表明,两阶段定价给予了广告主和广告媒体更为灵活的选择方式.两阶段定价不仅使广告主可以避免较高的广告成本支出,而且能够有效地制止点击欺诈和规避信息不对称性带来的风险,而广告媒体则可以获得额外的收益和吸引更多潜在的广告主,利用数值算例验证了结论的有效性.

This paper builds a two-stage revenue pricing model between the advertisers and publishers and applies the Nash bargaining method to determine the optimal two-stage pricing problem. It identifies the feasible conditions of the implementation on the two-stage contract and analyzes the relationship between the negotiation power and the first stage pricing. The study shows that the two-stage pricing contract brings both advertisers and publishers more flexible options. That two-stage pricing not only reduces the advertisers＇ advertising costs, but also effectively stops click fraud and avoids the risks of asymmetry information. Thus, the publishers will gain extra revenues and attract more potential advertisers. Furthermore, the validity of conclusion is verified with a numerical example.