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Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation in an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game 被引量:2

Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation in an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game
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摘要 Classical theories explaining the evolution of cooperation often rely on the assumption that the involved players are symmetrically interacted.However,in reality almost all well-documented cooperation systems show that cooperative players are in fact asymmetrically interacted and that this dynamic may greatly affect the cooperative behavior of the involved players.Here,we developed several models based on the most well known spatial game of the Hawk-Dove game,while also considering the effects of asymmetric interaction.Such asymmetric games possess four kinds of strategies:cooperation or defection of strong player and cooperation or defection of weak player.Computer simulations showed that the probability of defection of the strong player decreases with decreasing the benefit to cost ratio,and that all kinds of strategy will be substituted by cooperation on behalf of the strong player if the benefit to cost ratio is sufficiently small.Moreover,weak players find it difficult to survive and the surviving weak players are mostly defectors,similar to the Boxed Pigs game.Interestingly,the patterns of kinds of strategies are chaotic or oscillate in some conditions with the related factors. Classical theories explaining the evolution of cooperation often rely on the assumption that the involved players are symmetrically interacted. However, in reality almost all well-documented cooperation systems show that cooperative players are in fact asymmetrically interacted and that this dynamic may greatly affect the cooperative behavior of the involved players. Here, we developed several models based on the most well known spatial game of the Hawk-Dove game, while also considering the effects of asymmetric interaction. Such asymmetric games possess four kinds of strategies: cooperation or defection of strong player and cooperation or defection of weak player. Computer simulations showed that the probability of defection of the strong player decreases with decreasing the benefit to cost ratio, and that all kinds of strategy will be substituted by cooperation on behalf of the strong player if the benefit to cost ratio is sufficiently small. Moreover, weak players find it difficult to survive and the surviving weak players are mostly defectors, similar to the Boxed Pigs game. Interestingly, the patterns of kinds of strategies are chaotic or oscillate in some conditions with the related factors.
出处 《Chinese Science Bulletin》 SCIE EI CAS 2013年第17期2248-2254,共7页
基金 supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (2007CB411600) the National Natural Science Foundation of China (30670272,30770500,10961027,31270433 and 10761010) the Yunnan Natural Science Foundation (2009CD104) the State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution,Kunming Institute of Zoology,Chinese Academy of Sciences(GREKF09-02) the West Light Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Special Fund for the Excellent Youth of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (KSCX2-EW-Q-9)
关键词 合作系统 游戏空间 非对称 博弈 维护 相互作用 计算机模拟 asymmetric interaction cooperation spatial games Hawk-Dove game
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