摘要
通过整理和研究有关竞业禁止的案例发现:就保护商业秘密而言,商业秘密侵权之诉难度更大、胜算更低,企业更倾向于依据竞业禁止协议提起违约之诉。但在经济补偿金和竞业禁止协议的效力关系上,法院倾向于认定未约定或未支付经济补偿金的竞业禁止协议无效。鉴于占据主导地位的"无效说"使得用人单位商业秘密权的保护陷入两难境地,且实质上并未有效保护劳动者的择业权,笔者赞同"有效说"之法律设计,允许用人单位和劳动者进行协议补充以确认竞业禁止协议之效力。
By collating and researching non-compete cases, we find that : in terms of the protection of trade secrets, due to the fact that infringement complaints are difficult to be supported, companies are more likely to bring breach of contract lawsuits based on non-compete agreements. But on the relationship between economic compensation and the effectiveness of non-compete agreement, the courts tend to identify the non-compete a- greement without economic compensation invalid. Since the dominant "invalid theory" puts the protection of trade secrets into a dilemma and does not substantially protect workers' right to choose employment, we agree with the "valid theory" which allows the employer and the employee to reach supplementary agreements to con- firm the effectiveness of non-compete agreement.
出处
《西南政法大学学报》
2013年第3期43-48,共6页
Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law
关键词
商业秘密
竞业禁止协议
侵权之诉
违约之诉
trade secrets
non-compete agreement
breach of contract lawsuits
infringement complaints