租税互替:地方政府房地产政策选择

Rent-Tax Substitution:Local Governments'Choice in Real Estate Policy

经济增长是国家进行宏观经济调控的主要目标,也是评价各级政府管理能力的重要指标,影响经济增长的原因很多,本文从税收、地租和官员晋升激励三个视角进行分析。首先对国内外相关的文献进行综述,构建地租和税收互替的理论模型,通过30个省、区、市的面板数据加以验证,然后引入官员晋升激励,分析政府政策选择对经济的影响。结果显示,租、税存在互替性;租、税显著提高要素的产出弹性,却不利于技术进步。官员晋升激励对技术进步显著正的影响。政府无论对租或税采取激励政策都会造成经济的扭曲,税收对经济的扭曲效应轻于地租。

Economic growth is the main goal of national macroeconomic control, and also an important index to evaluate the management ability of the local governments at different levels. This paper analyses the economic growth from three aspects such as tax revenue, land rent and incentives for officials＇ promo- tion. First, based on reviewing foreign and domestic relevant research, we construct a theoretical model of rent-tax substitution, and test the model with the panel data from 30 provinces, autonomous regions and cites. The results show that rent and tax significantly improve the output elasticity of elements but hinder technical progress, and that without government intervention, they can substitute each other. Then we make a further analysis of the result under the influence of incentives for officials＂ promotion. We find that whether the governments＇ incentive policy can improve rent or tax, it will cause significant negative efficiency on technical progress. Compared with land rent influence, tax does less distortion to economy.