论胡塞尔现象学对自在之物的批判

On Husserlian Phenomenology's Criticism of Thing-in-Itself

在康德哲学中,自在之物既有先验观念论的含义,也有超验实在论的含义,两种含义分别代表了康德进行理性批判的不同立场。胡塞尔将这两种立场纳入自然主义态度和现象学态度的对立之中,并主张通过现象学的反思将康德的先验观念论彻底化,同时消解了康德哲学中自在之物的超验实在论设定。

In Kant＇s philosophy, Thing-in-itself includes the meaning of transcendental idealism and transcendent realism, and these two meanings respectively represent different positions of Kant＇s rational criticism. Husserl brought these two positions into the opposition of naturalistic attitude and phenomenological attitude, and he advocated advancing Kant＇s transcendental idealism through phenomenological reflection, which would eliminate the set of transcendent realism about thing-in-itself at the same time.