摘要
构建了地方政府间协调博弈模型,通过博弈均衡、演化稳定均衡分析,探讨了其利益关系与行为互动的前提和影响因素,认为影响地方政府间协调合作的主要因素包括利益分配比例、贴现因子、合作效率等,其协调合作行为的演化及稳定还受到双方策略初始条件的影响。
The coordination and cooperation between local governments are significant to the decision and implement of public policy and the development of region economics. In this paper, we propose a coordination game model and analyze the interest relationship and interaction between local govern- ments by the equilibriums and evolutionary stable equilibriums of the game. The results show that proportion of allocation, discount factor, and cooperation efficiency are important factors of the emer- gency of cooperation. Furthermore, the initial strategies of local governments will affect the evolution of cooperation and its stable in evolutionary dynamic.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
北大核心
2013年第3期340-344,共5页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition
基金
武汉理工大学自主创新项目(121419006)
教育部人文社科青年基金(11YJCZH221)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2012-ib-066)
关键词
地方政府
协调博弈
合作
均衡
local governments
coordination game
cooperation
equilibrium