摘要
秦汉以降,中国古代各朝都以强化专职监察权作为防治腐败的重要措施,这种措施虽然对于澄清吏治起到了一定的作用,但也产生了一系列弊害和恶果,其主要表现是:以监察职能混淆行政职能和审判职能,扰乱正常的行政秩序和司法秩序;监察机关和监察官员因拥权过重且缺乏监督而自身严重腐败;监察机关因其工具性本质而使其职能发生严重异化。就总体的实施效果而言,中国古代强化监察权并没有成为防治腐败的良策,相反在很大程度上加剧了贪腐之风和强化了腐败产生机制。中国古代强化监察权之所以没有成功,其根源是权力一体化的政治制度。
From the Qin and Han dynasties on, every dynasty in China strengthened the professional su-pervision to prevent corruption, but it still brought about evil consequences. Supervision function dis-turbed the usual administration and legal system and abused the power, which led to more serious corrup-tion. In general, the supervision system in ancient China could not prevent corruption, and further led to more corruption. The root for this is the political system of power centralization.
出处
《河北学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期154-159,共6页
Hebei Academic Journal
关键词
中国古代
强化监察权
腐败
权力一体化
ancient China
strengthening supervision power
corruption
power centralization