高管政治关联与企业现金持有:“扶持”还是“掠夺”?——基于不同产权视角的研究

Managerial Political Connections and Corporate Cash-holding: Support or Pillage?——Evidence Based on Different Ownership

文章首次基于不同产权视角,研究企业的高管政治关联对企业现金持有行为影响机制的差异。以我国上市公司为样本研究发现,地方国企高管的政治关联分别对企业现金持有水平及其市场价值有显著的正向和负向作用,支持了高管政治关联的"掠夺"假说;民企高管的政治关联对企业现金持有水平及其价值均有显著的负向影响,支持了"扶持"假说;而央企高管的政治关联对企业现金持有水平及其价值均无显著影响。企业的产权性质会显著影响高管政治关联对企业现金持有行为的作用机制,这一结论对于企业财务领域的研究与实务具有较强的启示意义。

This paper investigates the different impacts of managerial political connections on corporate cash-holding based on different ownership. With the sample of Chinese listed companies, it is found that local SOEs＇ managerial political connections are associated with higher levels of cash holdings and lower value of corporate cash holdings, which support ＂pillage＂ presupposition of managerial political connections. The private enterprises＇ managerial political connections are associated with both lower levels and value of cash holdings, which is in accordance with ＂support＂ hypothesis of managerial political connections. However, both the level and the value of cash-holding of SOE owned by the central government do not change with its managerial political connections.