“例外”与“常规”的争执——施米特与凯尔森法哲学比较研究

The Conflict between Exception and Norm:A Comparative Study on Schmitt's and Kelsen's Philosophy of Rights

施米特的法哲学思想以"例外"(Ausnahme)为标志,凯尔森的法哲学思想以"基础规范"(Grundnorm)、"常规"(Norm)为标志。两者之间的冲突,远非20世纪30年代"谁是宪法的守护者"那场论战所能涵盖。除了"宪法的守护者"之争外,两人还有更深层次的冲突:启示与理性以及圣经旧约与新约的冲突。这一冲突恰恰昭示出现代法哲学与政治哲学的最核心问题——实际也是西方思想的关键问题!施米特没有回避这一思想争执,他创建的政治宪法学,将凯尔森的纯粹法思想融入到自己的法哲学理论之中,从而既保留了启蒙运动以来的"理性"地位;又以"例外"昭示现代人:"启示"并没有被"理性"所击溃。

Carl Schmitt＇ s thought about philosophy of right takes exception （Ausnahme） as the mark, while Hans Kelsen＇ s takes basic Grundnorm or norm as the mark. The conflict between them could not be included in the controversy about who is the guarantor of constitution in the 1930s. Apart from this, they have deeper con- flict between inspiration and rationality as well as the Old Testament and the New Testament. The conflicts ex- pose the core problem about the philosophy of rights and political philosophy, which is also the key problem of western thought. Carl Schmitt doesn＇ t avoid this conflict and establishes the Constitutional Theory, which ab- sorbs Kelsen＇ s Pure Theory of Law into his theory of philosophy of rights. Thus Schmitt maintains not only the position of rationality after the Enlightenment but also makes clear to the Modernist with exception that inspiration is not defeated by rationality.