摘要
考虑到国与国之间博弈是在不完全信息条件下进行的,本文采用多群体非对称动态演化博弈论,分析人民币区域化进程中必须面对的国际货币发行国与非国际货币发行国之间的博弈。通过演化博弈模型的推导和分析,得出两点结论:一是美日作为国际货币发行国会长期抵制人民币区域化;二是非国际货币发行国应长期选择共同合作,主动推进本国货币国际化。最后,在此基础上,从内外战略两个方面提出人民币在东亚实现区域化的政策性建议。
Considering the game between countries is under incom plete information,the article adopts asymmetric multi-group analysis of dynamic evolutionary game theory to discuss the game being confronted with China in the process of RMB regionalization between international currency issuing countries and those without issuing international currency.Two conclusions are reached via derivation and analysis under the model of evolutionary game.First,the United States and Japan as international currency issuing countries will put a long-term resistance against the RMB regionalization.Second,a long-term cooperation shall be built among the non-international currency issuing countries to promote the internationalization of home currencies.On this basis,the article puts forward policy suggestions on how to achieve RMB regionalization in East Asia both from the consideration of both inside and outside China.
出处
《上海金融》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期3-7,116,共5页
Shanghai Finance
基金
2010年度中国国家社会科学基金项目"中国积极参与国际货币体系改革进程研究"(项目批准号10ZD054)
2011年福建省教育厅社会科学研究项目"国际货币体系及中国的对策"的资助
关键词
人民币区域化
演化博弈
美国
日本
RMB Regionalization
Evolutionary Game
the United States
Japan