高管声誉激励对企业绩效的影响机制

Effects of Presidents’ Reputation Incentives on Firm Performance

采用倾向得分匹配分析法(PSM),对2000年以后获得外部市场声誉的54名上市公司董事长的声誉激励对企业绩效的影响及其微观机制进行了实证分析,并检验了所有权的影响,结果表明,声誉激励不能降低代理成本,但能提高代理效率,从而能够提升公司的经营绩效;同时声誉激励的效果会因不同所有权而有所差异。研究对于完善企业高管激励机制具有一定的参考价值。

This paper investigates the effects of presidents＇ reputation incentives on firm performance in Chinese listed firms after year 2000 and employs the propensity score matching methodology, Meanwhile, we refer to the influence of ownership on the effects. The results show that the reputation incentives can improve agency efficiency rather than decrease agency cost. Finally they can improve firm performance and the effects are difference because of different ownership.