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基于心理学博弈理论的互惠行为模型分析 被引量:7

Analysis of Psychological Game Model Based on Reciprocal Behavior
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摘要 互惠行为是人类社会活动中的一种基本的行为方式,它不同于主流经济学中"理性人"的行为方式,并对社会经济活动和制度产生重要的影响。本文主要的工作是根据互惠行为的特征,给出了反映互惠行为程度的互惠函数,并在"心理学"博弈理论的分析框架下提出了互惠均衡的概念,由此建立模型进行分析。在此基础上,进一步讨论互惠均衡的一些性质和应用模型结果解释互动中的一些行为现象。最后,将互惠博弈模型应用于劳动经济学中的雇佣关系分析,解释阿克洛夫把雇用关系理解为"礼物交换"的观点。本文所探讨的理论和应用研究进一步丰富了经济学行为理论,并有着一定的理论作用和现实意义。 Reciprocal Behavior is a regulation of behavior in human activity and has an important affect on human social activity. In this paper reciprocal function is given according to the chara.cteristic of reciprocal behavior. Accordingly, we put forward an equilibrium concept of reciprocal behavior Game and build a Game model based on psychology. The property of reciprocal equilibrium is furtherly studied and explain behavior phenomena in interaction based on this model. Eventually, the psychological game model is applied to analyze the employment contract in labor market and explain Akerlof' s view that regards labor contract as a partial "Gift Exchange". The research enriches economic theory and has practical implications.
作者 唐俊 王翊
出处 《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2013年第5期79-84,共6页 Systems Engineering
基金 国家社会科学基金资助项目(09BJL005)
关键词 互惠行为 心理学博弈 互惠均衡 Reciprocal Behavior Psychological Game Reciprocity Equilibrium
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参考文献11

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共引文献5

同被引文献62

  • 1张海,陈国宏,李美娟.技术创新扩散的博弈[J].工业技术经济,2005,24(8):56-57. 被引量:5
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  • 7Gy?rgy Szabó,Attila Szolnoki.Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games[J]Journal of Theoretical Biology,2011.
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