贸易自由化、国内否决者与国际贸易体系的法律化——美国贸易政治的国际逻辑

Trade Liberalization,Veto Players and the Legalization of International Trade System:The International Logic of American Trade Politics

作为一种特殊形式的制度化,国际法律化主要表现为国际制度在义务性和授权性上的进展。从这两个维度上看,世界贸易组织的建立显著增加了国际贸易体系的法律化程度。国际制度的进一步法律化不仅影响到国家间关系,而且具有重要的国内政治效应。如果国内否决者具有贸易保护的偏好,国家行为体在国内政治制度下将难以实现贸易自由化的目标。但是,国家行为体在国际合作的法律化进程中具有其他国内否决者难以获得的议程设定优势和信息优势。此外,国家行为体也可运用国际制度法律化所带来的社会影响和动员机会来克服其他否决者的阻碍。在美国贸易政治中,总统比国会具有更大的自由贸易倾向。当总统与国会在贸易政策上的偏好显著不同时,总统通过支持国际贸易体系的法律化来推动贸易自由化。世界贸易组织成立后,美国贸易政治的演变业已表明,国际制度的法律化降低了行政机构在国会压力下的脆弱性。在其他一些国家的国内贸易政治中,国际贸易体系的法律化也可以作为增强国家自主性的工具。

As a specific form of institutionalization,international legalization refers to variability in the level of obligation and delegation of international institutions.According to these dimensions,the establishment of WTO has increased the legalization of the international trade system.The further legalization of international institutions has important implications for interstate relations and domestic politics.If veto players in domestic political institutions have preference for protectionism,the state actors will hardly achieve their aims for free trade.However,state actors may gain greater agenda-setting and information advantages over other veto players through international cooperation.Moreover,the legalization of international institutions is helpful for state actors to overcome the objection of other veto players through the mechanisms of social influence and mobilization.In a relative sense,the President favors free trade and Congress favors protectionism in American trade politics.When preferences of the President are significantly different from those of Congress,the President may promote trade liberalization by supporting the legalization of international trade system.Evidence from American trade politics has shown that WTO decreases the Administration's vulnerability to Congressional pressures.In the trade politics of some other countries,the legalization of international trade system enhances the state autonomy in similar way.