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企业员工隐性合同管理分析

Management of Employees' Implicit Contract
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摘要 长期以来,企业及员工之间的行为、关系、责任都是以显性合同加以规范,但是由于信息的有限性及成本导致显性合同在执行过程中的局限性。带来的的结果是:企业失信、员工失信,企业、员工社会责任缺失。隐性合同是基于合同双方的心理的非限定契约,这种非限定性可以根据契约双方需要增加信息。隐性合同的这一特性可以有效地弥补和解决显性合同的缺陷,使隐形合同更具强制力。文章主要研究企业、员工之间的隐性合同模型构建条件、模型构建以及研究在隐性合同条件下的企业、员工间的责任。 The behavior, relations and responsibilities between enterprise and employees have been regulated by explicit contracts for a long time, but due to the limited information and cost result in the limit in the implement process with an effect of incredibility on enterprises, employees and their lack of sense of social responsibilities. Implicit contracts are non-finite contract based on bilateral and psychological contract. The non-finite character could add information according to both needs, and make it more enforceable, which can compensate and solve the deficiency of explicit contract. This article researches mainly on structure condition of implicit contract model, model establishment and responsibilities between enterprises and employees under the condition of implicit contract.
作者 王静 张治民
出处 《价值工程》 2013年第20期175-176,共2页 Value Engineering
关键词 隐形合同 企业——员工 责任 契约 implicit contract enterprise-employee responsibility contract
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