地沟油治理政策的博弈分析与政策建议

Theoretical Analysis and Policy Suggestions for Alternative Policies Concerning Waste Oil Governance

使用博弈论中的完全信息模型分析了两种地沟油治理政策:监督餐饮企业用油政策与委托专业公司收购地沟油政策。通过模型分析可知,与监督餐饮企业用油政策相比,实施委托收购地沟油的政策对于企业内部信息的依赖性较少,且对被委托收购企业和生产地沟油企业均有激励作用,因此建议政府优先采用该种政策。基于模型分析,结合国外的治理经验,提出如下政策建议:建立完善的餐厨垃圾追溯体系;实现"地沟油"变废为宝;切实提高食用油品检测标准;立法部门应制定针对地沟油危害的专门条文,切实加大惩罚力度。

This paper,by adopting the complete information model from game theory,analyzed the two types of waste oil governance policies： supervising catering enterprises and commissioned acquisition of waste oil to professional companies.Game analysis of the two alternative cases shows that compared to supervising catering enterprises,commissioned acquisition of waste oil policy is less reliant on information within the enterprise,and that it also gives incentives to the enterprise which is commissioned to the acquisition and production of waste oil.Therefore,it is suggested that governments give priority to the latter.Based on the model analysis and experiences from abroad,some suggestions were proposed including establishing and improving the food waste traceability system,turning waste oil into treasure,effectively improving testing standards of edible oil products,developing a specific legislative provision against waste oil hazards,and effectively increasing the punishment.