摘要
在开启家庭这只"黑匣子"的过程中,经济学家们采取了三种理论方法,即共同偏好模型、合作博弈模型和非合作博弈模型。一致同意和利他主义模型的联合收入假设遭到了理论与实证两方面的质疑,纳什议价方法和鲁宾斯坦轮流出价博弈方法被用于政府对家庭的课税、转移支付、社会习俗对家庭行为的规范、从事家务劳动的妇女的企业专用资本及人力资本的折旧、家庭暴力与儿童虐待等现实问题的分析中,取得了较为理想的结论。
While opening the 'black box' of family,the economists have adopted three theory frameworks which are common preference models,cooperative models and no cooperative models.The income pooling assumption of consensus model and altruist model is challenged by theoretical and empirical approach;and then Nash bargaining approach and Rubinstein's offering in turn game application to government taxes,transfer,social customs regulating the family behavior,firm-specific investment and human capital depreciation of housewives,domestic violence and children abusing,etc.,which arrive at an ideal conclusion.
出处
《淮阴师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2013年第3期318-324,419,共7页
Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
2011年度湖北省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目(2011LJ003)
2012年度湖北省教育厅人文社会科学项目(2012G197)
关键词
博弈论
家庭分配
模型
game theory
family distribution
model