发展中国家的中央银行独立性与外国直接投资——信号机制的解释与实证分析

CBI and F DI in Developing Countries from a Signal Mechanism Perspective

吸引外国直接投资(FDI)是发展中国家提高中央银行独立性的重要目的之一。提高发展中国家中央银行独立性对FDI具有促进作用,这种作用主要基于一种信号机制。从信号机制过程看,提高发展中国家中央银行独立性是一种提高可信度的制度安排;从信号内容实际效果看,提高中央银行独立性将带来相对低的通胀预期、货币政策稳定预期与一定的经济可预测性;从信号传递效果看,国际金融机构和国际信用评级机构起到了信号强化的作用。实证分析的结果显示二者之间具有显著的正相关关系。

Attracting foreign direct investment （FDI） is an important purpose for developing countries to improve the central bank independence （CBI）. CBI in developing countries promotes FDI because of a signaling mechanism. It is an institutional arrangement to improve credibility, bring the relatively low inflation expectations and stable monetary policy expectations and certain economic predictability. Ihe international financial institutions and international credit rating agencies enhance the signal role. Empirical analysis has shown significant positive correlation between them.