摘要
零售商的商品销售和市场知识共享对于零售商和制造商都具有互补性,可以将这两项工作视为一项"工程",它在实践中被分解为一系列相关的子任务来完成。从一个制造商和多个零售商构成的二级供应链出发,假定制造商、零售商均为风险中性,制造商可以具有多重行为观测手段,借鉴"要么全部要么全无"激励方案设计的思想,搭建了一个零售商多任务参与的供应链激励合约设计的分析基础。按照投入观测的"不可观测性"、"可观测且可证实性"及"可观测但不可证实性"三种情况讨论了制造商的最优合约设计问题。
The relationship between commodity sales and market knowledge sharing is complementary for both retailer and ,nanufaeturer. So they can be regarded as one ＂project＂ which consists of a series of interrelated subtasks. Assume that a two stage supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and multiple ,＇elailers, both retailer and manufacturer are risk neutral. Based on the idea of ＂all-or-nothing＂, this article structures an analytical framework, which is participated by one retailer and multitasks as a design of supply chain incentive eontract, to discuss the three scenarios for achieving optimized contract design of manufaeture.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2013年第7期127-131,共5页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71271077)
关键词
多任务委托代理
供应链
激励合约
multitask principal-agent
supply chain
incentive contract
