具有质量竞争的供应链网络均衡研究

Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Quality Competition

文章研究了具有质量竞争的供应链网络均衡问题。借助Lagrange对偶理论和有限维变分不等式理论,刻画了供应市场、零售市场及供应链网络的均衡条件,并利用投影算法对模型进行求解。结合算例,讨论了质量标准、质量成本系数对网络均衡的影响。数值结果表明:当质量标准较低时,制造商存在一个高于质量标准的均衡质量水平;当行业质量标准超过该均衡质量水平时,随着行业质量标准的提高,制造商利润会降低,而零售商利润会增加;随着行业质量标准的增加,供应链网络总利润呈现出先增后减规律,因此从供应链网络整体来看,行业质量标准应当适当,不能定得过高。同时,具有质量成本优势的制造商,会提高均衡质量水平,而具有质量成本劣势的制造商,会降低均衡质量水平,目的是增加产品质量差异以增加利润。

In this article, the supply chain network equilibri- um with quality competition was developed. Lagrange dual theory and finite dimensional variational inequality theory are utilized to describe the equilibrium conditions of the supplymarket, the retail market, as well as the supply chain net- work. The discussion are presented to illustrate the quality standard and the quality cost coefficient impact on the net- work equilibrium. The result shows that： when quality standard is lower, manufactures have a higher equilibrium quality level than the quality standard; When the quality standard exceeds the equilibrium quality level, as the quality standard goes up- per, the profit of manufactures will decrease, while the profit of retailers will increase; With the quality standard raising, the total profit of supply chain network emerges increase first- ly and then decrease. Therefore. in the view of supply chain network, the industry quality standard should be appropriate rather than setting too high. Meanwhile the manufactures, with the advantage of quality cost, will improve the equilibrium quality level, while the disadvantaged manufacturers will lower the equilibrium quality level in order to increase product quality difference to increase more profits.