基于逆向拍卖的采购与定价管理

Procurement and Pricing Management Based on Reverse Auction

基于逆向拍卖的采购与定价管理问题中,面临随机需求的零售商首先确定一个采购合同,然后供应商投标,通过逆向拍卖选取一个获胜的供应商,由该供应商确定采购量并传递给零售商,同时零售商做定价决策影响其需求,目标是寻求一个最优的采购与定价决策以最大化零售商的期望利润。当随机需求函数为加式时,在一定的条件下,证明零售商的期望收益(不包括采购费用)是采购量的单峰函数,从而得到其最优的采购与定价策略。对指数需求分布情形给出了算例,对当前零售业中流行的通道费和供应商管理库存现象进行了很好的解释。

In this paper, we address the procurement and pricing management based on reverse auction. The retailer facing the sto- chastic demand first designs a procurement contract that specifies a payment for each possible purchase quantity and then invites the suppliers to bid for this contract in the reverse auction. The winning supplier is given the decision right for the quantity produced and delivered, and the retailer makes pricing decision simultaneously. We study the problem from the retailer＇ s standpoint, seeking an op- timal procurement and pricing strategy that maximizes his expected profit. When the stochastic demand model is additive, under some relatively mild conditions, we show that the retailer＇ s expected revenue （ not including the procurement cost } is a unimodal function of the purchased quantity, thus obtain the optimal ordering and pricing decision for the retailer. Specially, we give some numerical examples under exponential demand distribution. Furthermore, we give a reasonable explanation for the use of slotting allowance and vendor -managed inventory in the retail industry.