管理者自利行为与债务融资期限结构研究——基于债权人保护视角

Research on Management Self-interest, and Debt Maturity Structure——Based on Creditor Protection

委托代理理论认为公司管理者的利益和公司股东、债权人的利益不可能完全一致,管理者通常以自身利益为出发点做出行为的选择。文章认为这种管理者自利行为分为防御行为和侵占行为两种,并且影响到企业债务期限结构的形成。400多家制造业企业上市公司4年的样本数据回归结果表明,管理者自利行为程度和债务期限结构呈显著的倒"U"型,管理者的防御行为仅体现在债权人利益保护程度较高的少数样本公司中,大部分样本公司的债务期限结构是债权人对风险控制的结果。

In the principal-agent theory, the managers＇interests can not be completely consistent to the interests of shareholders creditors, managers usually make the choice of behavior in their own interests. The article maintains that this manager self-interested behavior is divided into two kinds entrenchment and expropriation, which has influenced the corporate debt maturity structure. Data regression of more than 400 manufacturing listed companies＂ results that the de- gree of managers＇self-interested behavior and debt maturity structure was significantly inverted ＂ U＂ shape. The entrenchment behavior of managers is only reflected in a few samples of compa- nies, in which the level of creditors＇protection was higher. In the majority of the samples, the debt maturity structure became under the creditor risk control.