摘要
利用A股上市公司2001—2010年的数据研究发现,商业信用能提高高管薪酬,但是不能提高公司价值。商业信用和高管薪酬在对公司价值起负作用时存在替代关系,这种替代关系在不同产权性质的企业并无明显差异。研究表明:当高管薪酬主要还是以业绩为基础,高管就有足够的动机利用商业信用制造"不真实的增长",从而达到获得高额报酬的目的,但是高管这一行为损害了股东的利益;商业信用和高管薪酬在降低公司价值的作用中存在替代关系,上市公司要在商业信用制度性安排和高管薪酬激励机制之间权衡。
Using Chinese stock market data disclosed by the listed firms from 2001 to 2010, this paper investigates the relationship among trade credit, top management compensation and firm value. We find that trade credit has positive influence on top management compensation but neg- ative influence on Firm Value. And there is a substitute relationship between trade credit and top management compensation when both of them have negative influence on firm value. This study also indicates that, once the executive pay is performance based, the top management have motivation to manipulate the growth rate through trade credit, which damages the benefits of shareholders. Thus, the listed companies should make a trade-off between trade credit arrange- ment and executive incentive compensation.
出处
《科学决策》
2013年第5期33-44,共12页
Scientific Decision Making
关键词
商业信用
高管薪酬
公司价值
替代关系
trade credit
top management compensation
firm value
substitute relationship
