基于演化博弈论解决建筑业中的“囚徒困境”难题

Solution to “The Prisoner's Dilemma” Problem in Construction Industry Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

试图以演化博弈论中的演化稳定策略(ESS)的视角来解决我国建筑业的"囚徒困境"问题,并进而对企业实施Partnering模式的合作策略选择问题进行探究。研究认为,可替代型企业只要满足一定条件,同样存在演化稳定的合作行为,这为有竞争关系的建筑企业选择合作策略提供了理论依据。论文还系统研究了在合作行为演化稳定的状态下,各类建筑企业的互补性、替代性、技术水平等内部属性与其合作意愿、努力程度、生产效率、合作利润等外显因素之间的相关性问题,为在实际工程中制定科学合理的Partnering模式管理机制提供理论指导。

With the perspective of the repeated game theory and the evolutionary stable strategy, the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ problem in the construction industry was tried to solve, and to explore whether the cooperation strategies are the best choice for all of participants in Partnering or not. It is known that the substitute construction enterprises were suited to cooperate only under the circumstance of less similarities. This conclusion provides a solid theoretical basis for choosing coorperation strategy between construction enterprises having competition relations. The relationship between the essential natures of enterprises, such as resource complementarity, strength comparability, production technology level and so on, was researched, and the external natures, such as willingness to cooperate, effort level for cooperation, production efficiency were also discussed, including relative problems on profit from cooperation, under the premise of cooperative behavior being stable in evolution. This study can provide theoretical guidance for implementation of partnering management in the engineering.