摘要
根据中小型房地产企业与银行等金融机构间信贷交易行为特征,在理性经济人、信息不对称、动态博弈过程等五个相关假设条件下,构建了不完全信息动态博弈模型,通过对二者间的效用函数及博弈过程分析,得出了中小型房地产企业与银行等金融机构的信贷交易关系,并解释了银行等金融机构对中小型房地产企业"惜贷"行为的原因,进而提出中小型房地产企业获得资金支持的对策与建议,包括:与金融机构建立信息对称的沟通机制和共享平台,积极向银行等金融机构提供财务状况、管理制度、经营情况等反映企业资金实力的信息,推动双方建立良好的信贷关系;不断完善中小房地产企业的信用保证体系,增进与金融机构的良好信贷关系;积极拓宽融资渠道、实现投资主体的多元化等。
Based on the features of credit trading behavior between small and medium real estate enterprises (Sm-REEs) and banks and other financial organizations, according to corresponding assumptions of ration- al participators and so forth, a dynamic game model on incomplete information is built. Then it works out the relation of credit trading behavior between Sm-REEs and banks and other financial organizations and explains the reason why these organizations limit their loans to those real estate enterprises through the util- ity function and the analysis of game process. Subsequently, presenting proposals to enhance the Sm- REEs' finance,including:to establish the communication mechanism & sharing platform of symmetry in- formation between Sm-REEs and banks and other financial organizations based on providing their financing condition ,management system, operation level etc. ;to develop and boost the credit system of enterprises increasingly to enhance the better relation with financing organizations; and to expand enterprises financing channels in order to realize the diversification of investment owners, etc.
出处
《沈阳建筑大学学报(社会科学版)》
2013年第2期193-196,共4页
Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University:Social Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJC630122)
住房和城乡建设部科学技术计划项目(2011-R3-37)
关键词
房地产企业
信贷风险
不完全信息
动态博弈
real estate enterprises
credit risk
incomplete information
dynamic games